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IN
PERSONAM
JURISDICTION-MINIMUM
TACTS-RATIFICATION-PROMOTERS CONTRACTS-The Third

CON-

Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that the pre-incorporation acts of a promoter, when coupled with post-incorporation ratification, may suffice to justify the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in the state of pre-incorporation activities.
Rees v. Mosaic Technologies, Inc. 742 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1984).
In November, 1982, Donald Rees entered into an oral agreement
in Pennsylvania with Frank Williams, then promoter and later first
president of Mosaic Technologies, Inc.1 Both were residents of
Pennsylvania at the time of contracting. 2 The terms of this exclusive search contract required Rees to recruit personnel to fill upper-level management positions within the corporation.' During
this time, Rees dealt primarily with Williams, although two other
promoters of Mosaic, Douglas Calloway and James Marshall were
peripherally involved.
On April 6, 1983, Mosaic was incorporated under the laws of
5
Delaware, with its principal place of business in New Hampshire.
That same month, James Marshall, a New Hampshire resident, replaced Williams as the new corporation's chief executive officer.6
From then on, Rees dealt primarily with Marshall, via telephone
conversations between their respective offices in Pennsylvania and
New Hampshire. It was during this latter period 8 that Marshall
allegedly assured Rees that he would retain the exclusive search
1. Rees v. Mosaic Technologies, Inc., 742 F.2d 765, 767 (3d Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 767.
3. Id. at 767. An additional purpose of the contract was for Rees to supply Williams
with competitive information concerning similar businesses, and to develop business contacts for Williams, in an effort to get the corporation started. Id.
4. Id. Both Williams and Calloway utilized Rees' office until mid-April, 1983, in an
effort to hold down pre-incorporation expenses. Marshall, on the other hand, operated exclusively out of New Hampshire. Id.
5. Id. at 766. The corporation was first incorporated under the name Work Stations,
Inc., but that name was later changed to the current Mosaic Technologies, Inc., on May 6,
1983. Id. at 767.
6. Id.
7. Id. On April 19, 1983, Marshall approved payment of an invoice submitted by Rees
and dated April 15, 1983, for services performed. This payment was made to Rees on a
company check. Id.
8. From mid-April, 1983, to May, 1983. Id.
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contract for the corporation.'

On May 16, 1983, however, Marshall terminated the exclusive
search contract and instructed Rees to cease all recruiting efforts."
Rees responded by bringing an action against Mosaic in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania."
Rees sought a declaratory judgment affirming the existence and validity of the contract, an order enjoining Mosaic from recruiting for
any further positions for which Rees held the exclusive search contract, and for damages.'" Mosaic, in response, moved to dismiss for
lack of in personam jurisdiction. 3
In the district court, Rees asserted that Mosaic's subsequent ratification of the pre-incorporation agreement had created the necessary minimum contacts sufficient to justify the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 1 4 In a three-part analysis, the district court
disagreed.
The district court first held that the pre-incorporation activities
of the promoters could not be attributed to the company inasmuch
as the corporation did not then exist. 5 As a result, the court reasoned, subsequent incorporation could not give rise to the necessary minimum contacts for the valid exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.'"
Rees next argued that Mosaic's ratification of the pre-incorporation agreement, entered into in Pennsylvania, had subjected Mosaic to in personam jurisdiction.'" The court disagreed, concluding
that to adopt Rees' argument would serve to subject a foreign corporation to liability for contacts established after the fact. 8
9. 742 F.2d at 767.
10. Id. Rees claimed that he had already contracted with recruits for several positions
within the company. Id.
11. Rees v. Mosaic Technologies, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 31, 32 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
12. Id. at 32. Mosaic also sought dismissal on two other grounds: (1) failure to state a
claim; and (2) as an exercise of the court's discretion. The court, however, did not address
these issues because it found that Rees could not establish in personam jurisdiction. Id.
13. Id. at 32-33.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing Bonner v. Travelers Hotel Inc., 276 Pa. 492, 120 A. 467 (1923); 18 AM.
JUR. 2D Corporations§ 119 (1965)).
16. 570 F. Supp. at 33. The basis for this reasoning is that since the corporation does
not exist at the time of contracting, it cannot later avail itself of the forum state's protection
in the event of a dispute (citing Procter & Schwartz, Inc., v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa.
Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974); Hicks v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 452 F. Supp. 130 (M.D. Pa.
1978)).
17. 570 F. Supp. at 33.
18. Id. The court could find no authority in support of Rees' contention, nor did it cite
precedent in support of its reasoning. See id.
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Finally, the court held that Mosaic's post-incorporation contacts
with Pennsylvania were insufficient to justify a finding of in personam jurisdiction.1 9 The suit was then dismissed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed.
The court began its analysis with a discussion of in personam jurisdiction and its due process implications. Relying on the mandates
of Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 0 the court
followed Pennsylvania law governing in personam jurisdiction.
Judge Adams,2 1 writing for the court, specifically noted that Pennsylvania's long-arm statute"2 provided jurisdiction over the person
with the most minimum of contacts within Pennsylvania, and to
the fullest extent allowed under the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.25
19. Id. The only activities occurring in Pennsylvania after Mosaic's incorporation related to securing additional venture capital, and had nothing to do with Rees' recruitment
contract. The court held that the telephone conversations between Rees and Marshall, and
the payment by company check to Rees for services rendered, were insufficient to support in
personam jurisdiction over Mosaic. Id. at 33 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (casual presence of the offending corporation, or isolated activities
in the forum state, will not give rise to a cause of action there)).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:
(e) Same: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State. Whenever a
statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a
summons, a notice, or an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of
or found within the state in which the district court is held, service may be made
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if
there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in
this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides (1) for service of a summons, a notice, or an order in lieu of summons
upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or
notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule; except that service by mail must be made pursuant to
the procedures set forth in paragraph (8) of subdivision (d) of this rule.
Id. See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (federal courts sitting in diversity must
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law).
21. Judge Adams was joined by Seitz, J., and Stewart, J. (Late Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, sitting by designation).
22. 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5322(b)(Purdon 1981). This section provides:
(b) Exercise of full constitutional power over nonresidents.- In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall
extend to all persons who are not within the scope of section 5301 (relating to persons) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and
may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under
the Constitution of the United States.
Id.
23. 742 F.2d at 767-68. See also Koenig v. International Bd. of Boilermakers, 284 Pa.
Super. 558, 567, 426 A.2d 635, 639 (1980) (Pennsylvania's long-arm statute is coextensive
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Using the above as a starting point, Judge Adams next analyzed
the applicable case law defining the lower limits of minimum contacts sufficient to exercise in personam jurisdiction in a Pennsylvania court over a foreign entity.2 ' The court concluded that the
proper standard was to be found in Procter & Schwartz, Inc. v.
Cleveland Lumber Company,2 5 which set forth a three-prong
2
test: 1

with the scope of personal jurisdiction as permitted by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). Pennsylvania's long-arm statute is known as a "generic" statute in conflicts terms.
24. 742 F.2d at 768. Citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
the court stated that, "Consonant with due process, personal jurisdiction may be asserted
over a nonresident corporation so long as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the corporation and the forum state." 742 F.2d at 768.
25. 228 Pa. Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974).
26. 742 F.2d at 768. At this juncture, the court relied upon World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) for the proposition that predictability of the legal
system is only possible when a defendant is able to structure its activities within a forum to
the extent that by those activities it "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there." Id. at 297.
For an excellent discussion of World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, see World-Wide
Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson: Reflections on the Road Ahead, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 65
(1980).
In World-Wide, the plaintiffs purchased an automobile from defendant Seeway Volkswagen. Thereafter, plaintiffs relocated to Arizona. While driving through Oklahoma, they
were involved in an accident, the result of which caused the plaintiffs to be severely burned.
The plaintiffs sued defendants Seeway and World-Wide in Oklahoma. World-Wide claimed
that Oklahoma had no jurisdiction over it, as its place of business was in New York, that it
distributed vehicles, parts and accessories under contract, to automobile dealers in New
York, New Jersey and Connecticut, and that it did no business in Oklahoma. 444 U.S. at
288-89. The United States Supreme Court agreed, concluding that these contacts did not
make it foreseeable that World-Wide would subsequently be called to defend itself in
Oklahoma. Id. at 298.
In what is the most significant case to date on in personam jurisdiction, the World- Wide
Court expressly reaffirmed its position that before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident, there must exist certain "minimum contacts" between the defendant
and the forum in order to satisfy due process requirements. Id. at 291. The Court reasoned
that these "minimum contacts" protected the non-resident against the inconvenience of defending in a distant forum. Id. at 291-92. Moreover, the Court also revived the underlying
principle of Pennoyer, and stated that requiring minimum contacts acts to ensure that
states "do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system." Id. at 292. In support of this dual policy underlying the
minimum contacts standard, the Court strongly emphasized "reasonableness" as a basis for
jurisdicition over the non-resident. Id. The Court noted that one consideration with regard
to "reasonableness" was the state's interest in protecting the rights of its citizens. Id. Upon
reflection, it is clear that the third prong of the Proctertest centers around these considerations. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
Also implicit in the Court's rationale in World-Wide was that the cause of action must be
directly related to the defendant's activities within the forum state. This is, essentially, the
second prong of the Procter test. In World-Wide, the fact that the defendant had never
conducted its business within the forum state was one of the key considerations to the

1985

Recent Decisions

[T]he defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
acting within the forum state thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws . . . . The cause of action must arise from defendant's activities
within the forum state . . . . Lastly, the acts of the defendant must have a

substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over it reasonable."

Applying this test to the instant case, the court stated that the
post-incorporation activities of Mosaic, standing alone, would not
have created sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction over Mosaic."8 Nevertheless, Judge Adams disagreed with the district
court's determination that pre-incorporation activities could not be
figured into the jurisdictional equation. 9
According to Judge Adams, while no case law concerning the jurisdictional aspects of pre-incorporation activities could be found,
the basic notion of post-incorporation ratification of pre-incorporation activities was well founded.30 He further noted that the acts of
the promoter, an agent of the corporation, once ratified, related
back to the time of the original activities. Therefore, the corporation would be liable for the acts of the promoter.3 " Thus, Judge
Court's holding that in personam jurisdicition could not be exercised over the defendant.
444 U.S. at 295.
Lastly, the Court in World-Wide reaffirmed the requirement that the non-resident must
have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the forum state. Once this
was found, the Court stated that the defendant could "reasonably [have] anticipate[d] being
haled into court there." Id. at 297. Again, this requirement is the same as the first prong of
the Procter test. Thus, it is clear that World-Wide leaves the Procterrationale undisturbed.
Other recent Supreme Court decisions have also strengthened Procter.The emphasis has

likewise been on the non-resident's "minimum contacts" with the forum; the "fairness" and
"reasonableness" of requiring a non-resident to litigate in a foreign state; the state's interest
in protecting its citizens; and whether the non-resident has purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of acting within the forum state. Reflecting once again on the Procterdecision will
show that the Court was concerned with each one of these factors. Therefore, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions dealing with in personam jurisdiction have not only left Procter
intact, but have also strengthened its doctrinal underpinnings. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 1473 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,
104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
27. 228 Pa. Super. at 19, 323 A.2d at 15.
28. Proctor, 742 F.2d at 768. See also supra note 19. Judge Adams compared Time
Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1984), as an analogous
situation where the circuit court applied the Procter test to find minimum contacts lacking.

742 F.2d at 768.
29. 742 F.2d at 768.
30. Id. at 768-69 (citing 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 119 (1965) for the proposition
that "a corporation does not exist as a legal entity until incorporated, and therefore cannot
have agents before its organization." 742 F.2d at 768). See also Harnett v. Ryan Homes,

Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878, 893 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (post-incorporation ratification can form the
basis for liability from pre-incorporation agreements), aff'd 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974).
31.

742 F.2d at 769. See 3 AM.

JUR.

2D Agency § 160 (1962); "The acts of ratification
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Adams concluded that under these circumstances, the first two
prongs of the Proctertest had been met; i.e., by entering into the
contract in Pennsylvania, Mosaic had availed itself of the protections and benefits of Pennsylvania law, and, also, that the cause of
action arose from its acts within Pennsylvania. 2
Finally, Judge Adams resolved the third prong of the Procter
test by stating simply that jurisdiction was both fair and reasonable in light of Pennsylvania's desire to ensure the performance of
contracts made within its borders.3 3 The judgment of the district
for further
court was then vacated, and the case was remanded
34
proceedings consistent with the court's opinion.
The Rees decision raises two distinct yet related issues. Namely,
whether the correct interpretation of Pennsylvania law on ratification was applied, 5 and whether the Procter test, still valid in light
of the latest cases handed down by the Supreme Court, 36 was properly administered to render in personam jurisdiction permissible.
To accurately determine the significance of Rees, the historical
scope of ratification and in personam jurisdiction must be exrelate back to the time of the original activities and establish an agency relationship permitting the acts of the promoter to constitute, in effect, acts done by the corporation." Id. at §
160. See also Comprehensive Group Serv. Bd. v. Temple University, 363 F. Supp. 1069, 1098
n.52 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (failure to repudiate constitutes acquiescence under Pennsylvania law,
thus binding the corporation); McCloskey v. Charleroi Mountain Club, 390 Pa. 212, 216-17,
134 A.2d 873, 876 (1957) (adoption, acceptance or ratification of pre-incorporation contract
causes liability both at law and in equity on the contract).
32. 742 F.2d at 769 (citing In re Eastern Supply Co., 267 F.2d 776, 778 (3d Cir. 1958)
(ratification of an act, purportedly done for principal by agent, is as effective at the time the
act was done), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 900 (1959)). The court also distinguished Bonner v.
Travelers Hotel, Inc., 276 Pa. 492, 120 A. 467 (1923), on which the district court had relied
to find no ratification. The Third Circuit indicated that Bonner properly stood for the proposition that a corporation will not be bound by a single promoter's contract if the corporation immediately and expressly repudiates it upon incorporation. 742 F.2d at 769.
33. 742 F.2d at 769. The court further stated that under the circumstances of the case,
Mosaic could reasonably have anticipated litigation in Pennsylvania. Id. See Koenig v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 284 Pa. Super. 558, 571, 426 A.2d 635, 641-42 (1980). See
also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (corporation's
contacts with forum state should be of such a degree that corporation could reasonably
anticipate being sued there). The court also placed great emphasis upon the fact that Mosaic's promoters, who dealt with Rees and subsequently ratified the contract, were at all
times acting with authority and later held top-level positions within the corporation. 742
F.2d at 769.
34. 742 F.2d at 770.
35. Under the mandates of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit. Therefore, in
the discussion pertaining to post-incorporation ratification, this note will deal primarily with
Pennsylvania law as interpreted by the supreme court.
36. See supra note 26.
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amined at length.
In Pennsylvania, although case law is relatively scarce, the law is
firmly established that a contract entered into between a promoter
and third party, without more, is not binding upon a subsequently
formed corporation.3 7 This general rule, which dates back to the
English Common law, 8 is based on well-grounded policy considerations.3 9 On the other hand, the law is equally clear that liability
will normally be imposed upon a corporation that accepts the benefits of contracts entered into between its promoters and third parties prior to incorporation. 40 This principle, first adopted in Pennsylvania in Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Christy, 1 has come to be
37. See Tift v. Quaker City National Bank, 141 Pa. 550, 553, 21 A. 660, 661 (1891)
(promise by single promoter, with no evidence of subsequent ratification, will not bind the
corporation); Bonner v. Travelers Hotel Co., Inc., 276 Pa. 492, 497, 120 A. 467, 468 (1923)
(contract by single promoter, immediately repudiated after incorporation, is but a contract
between individual promoter and contracting third party); Solomon v. Cedar Acres East,
Inc., 455 Pa. 496, 499-500, 317 A.2d 283, 285 (1974) (knowledge possessed by a single promoter, having only a minority interest, cannot bind the corporate defendant). See Also 1A
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, ch. 9 §205 (1983); 18 AM. JtI 2D Corporations §119
(1965).
38. See Richards, The Liability of Corporations on Contracts Made by Promoters, 19
HARV. L. REy. 97 (1906)(a thorough discussion of the English and American common law
developments on corporate liability for promoter's contracts). See also Bell's Gap R.R. v.
Christy, 79 Pa. 54, 21 A. 39 (1875)(citing and discussing English common law cases).
39. These policy considerations stem from a fundamental principle of contract law
which states that at least two competent parties are needed in order to enter into a binding
agreement. If one of those parties is "incompetent," as that term is generally understood by
the law, then the contract is void and of no effect. Because a corporation is not a competent
party prior to its existence, it cannot have agents acting for it and thus imposing liability
upon it. If the contrary were true, a newly formed corporation could be burdened with unknown liabilities affecting the interests of shareholders and others who deal with the corporation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 9 (1979), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 20 (1957) and comment c. See also 1A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, ch. 9
§ 205 (1983).
40. Fletcher's treatise on corporate law states:
American courts generally hold that a contract made by the promoters of a corporation on its behalf may be adopted, accepted or ratified by the corporation when organized, and that the corporation is then liable, both at law and in equity, on the
contract itself, and not merely for the benefits which it has received.
1A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §207 (1983)(see survey of American cases adhering
to this rule in footnote 2). See also McCloskey v. Charleroi Mountain Club, 390 Pa. 212,
216-17, 134 A.2d 873, 876 (1957), where the court held:
Where an agreement is entered into between incorporators and a promoter whereby
pre-incorporation services are to be performed on behalf of a corporation in return
for a specified compensation, the contract may be adopted, accepted or ratified by the
corporation when organized. The corporation then becomes liable both at law and in
equity on the contract.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Bell v. Scranton'Trust Co., 282 Pa. 562, 128 A. 494 (1925)
(ratification may be express or implied).
41. 79 Pa. 54, 21 Am. Rep. 39 (1875), aff'd sub nom. Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylva-
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known as ratification, or adoption.4 2
In Bell's Gap, the Pennsylvania-Supreme Court held that an informal group, associated for the purpose of a common objective
and with the intent to later form a corporation, may authorize certain acts to be done on its behalf, by one or more of its promoters,
with the understanding that these acts will be compensated for
upon subsequent incorporation.4 3 In reaching this conclusion, the
court placed great emphasis upon the fact that a majority of promoters could authorize such pre-incorporation acts in order to bind
the later formed corporation."
The corollary of this principle was first stated in Tift v. Quaker
City National Bank.45 There, the court held that a single promoter
could not bind a subsequently formed corporation, when there was
no evidence of ratification by the board of directors. 0 The thrust
of this decision was that evidence of subsequent ratification was
required before a pre-incorporation agreement could be held binding upon the corporation. Absent such evidence, knowledge of the
nia, 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
42. The term "ratification" as used by the Pennsylvania courts is not, technically
speaking, entirely correct. Ratification is the act of an existing principal ratifying a contract
made between his agent and another, where the agent is purportedly acting for the principal. If, as in the case of promoters' contracts, however, the principal does not exist at the
time of contracting, ratification is not possible. Instead, the correct term is "adoption" or
"novation". Richards, The Liability of Corporations on Contracts Made by Promoters, 19
HARiV. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (1906); Ehrich & Bunzl, Promoter's Contracts, 38 YALE L.J. 1011,
1031 (1929). Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts use these terms interchangeably, and, in the
interest of clarity they will be used interchangeably in this note. See, e.g., McCloskey v.
Charleroi Mountain Club, 390 Pa. 212, 216-17, 134 A.2d 873, 876 (1957); 8A P.L.E. Corporations § 18 (1971). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §84 (1957), and comment d.
43. 79 Pa. at 59.
44. Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
[T]he projectors or promoters of the enterprise . . . must be a majority at least of
such persons, and not one, two, or three, or a small minority thereof. Such minority
can have no more authority to bind the association or corporation in its incipient or
inchoate condition than they would have to bind it if fully organized.
Id. This is a minority position, adopted only by Pennsylvania and Nebraska. See 18 AM.
JUR. 2D Corporations§ 119 (1965). The majority position asserts that promoters, as opposed
to directors, cannot bind a corporation not yet in existence, no matter how unanimous they
may be. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. However, in Pennsylvania, the "majority of promoters" rule stems from cases in which the majority of promoters became directors of the subsequently formed corporation, and then impliedly or expressly ratified the
contract in question, i.e., the Pennsylvania minority rule is premised upon the notion that
these promoters later became directors of the corporation. See e.g., Girard v. Case Bros.
Cutlery Co., 225 Pa. 327, 74 A. 201 (1909); Beltz v. Garrison, 254 Pa. 145, 98 A. 956 (1916);
McCloskey v. Charleroi Mountain Club, 390 Pa. 212, 219 n.4, 134 A.2d 873, 877 n.4 (1959).
45. 141 Pa. 550, 21 A. 660 (1891).
46. Id. at 553, 21 A. at 661.
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contract in question would not be imputed to the board."7
Nearly two decades passed before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in Girard v. Case Brothers Cutlery Co.,48 shifted to a less
rigorous standard. The Girard court ruled that once the corporation's promoters accepted the benefits of a contract entered into
between one of them and a third party, the contract became binding upon the subsequently formed corporation unless it was renounced and disapproved by the corporation's board of directors. 49
In so holding, the court, in effect, shifted the burden of proving
renunciation of the contract from the plaintiff to the defendant
corporation. This holding was further expanded in Beltz v. Garrison,50 where the court held that ratification could be inferred from
acts, done by the corporation, which established that the corporation had accepted the benefits of a contract between a promoter
51
and third party.
In both Girard and Beltz, knowledge of the promoter's contract
was imputed to the board of directors-a result seemingly in contravention to the Tift holding. The difference in facts, however,
provides the basis for this distinction.5 2 In Tift, only one promoter
contracted with a third party, whereas in Girard and Beltz, a majority of promoters, who later became either officers or directors of
the newly formed corporation, accepted the benefits of a third
party contract and, once in positions of authority, these promoters
47. Id.
48. 225 Pa. 327, 74 A. 201 (1909). In Girard, prior to incorporation, the promoters of
the defendant corporation contracted to retain the services of Girard. Girard was to be an
officer of the new corporation, and to receive stock in the new corporation. Several months
after incorporation, Girard was discharged. Girard then sued to receive the monetary worth
of his stock in the corporation. Id. at 328, 74 A. at 202.
49. Id. at 333, 74 A. at 203. While, essentially, the Girard court shifted the burden of
proof onto the defendant corporation, it is important to note that the basic tenets of ratification, laid down in Bell's Gap R.R. Co., were reaffirmed. That is, if the corporation does
not renounce the pre-incorporation contract, the contract will be deemed to have been ratified. Moreover, as in Bell's Gap R.R. Co., the majority of the promoters were also the majority stockholders in the corporation. Id., 74 A. at 203.
50. 254 Pa. 145, 98 A. 956 (1916) (per curiam).
51. Id. at 152, 98 A. at 958. This was so even though the board of directors did not
pass a formal resolution accepting the contract. Id.
52. In Tift, the plaintiff testified that the promoter who had entered into the preincorporation contract with him had discussed the contract with other members of the
board of the newly formed corporation, and that the board did not object to the contract.
The court held, however, that this evidence was insufficient and "would not have amounted
to ratification by the corporation." 141 Pa. at 553, 21 A. at 661. Thus, the court was unwilling to impute knowledge of the promoter's contract to the board of directors. This result
stems from the fact that "the promise was made by a single promoter," who was not in the
"majority" of the newly formed enterprise. Id.

342

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 24:333

continued to accept the benefits of the contract. Thus, the company in this latter situation was held liable.53
Subsequent decisions have left this distinction intact. In Bonner
v. Travelers Hotel Company, Inc.,54 the court reiterated the proposition established in Tift that when a single promoter enters into
a contract with a third party, and a majority of the promoters, as
well as the corporation, immediately renounce the contract, the
corporation cannot be bound thereby5 Additionally, in Solomon
v. Cedar Acres East, Inc.,56 the most recent decision addressing
this issue, the court held that knowledge retained by a single promoter having only a minority interest could not bind a subse57
quently formed corporation.
Based on the foregoing authority, the current status of Pennsylvania law on ratification provides three criteria for holding a subsequently formed corporation liable on a promoter's contract. First, a
majority of the promoters must know of the existence of the contract; 58 second, those same promoters must later become officers or
directors of the newly formed corporation; and third, the officers or
directors, acting on behalf of the corporation, 59 must continue to
accept the benefits of the contract after the company has been
formed60
53. In Girard, the majority of promoters who had entered into the contract with the
plaintiff became majority shareholders and officers of the newly formed corporation. 225 Pa.
at 333, 74 A. at 203. Likewise, in Beltz, the promoters became directors and sole shareholders of all of the stock in the subsequently formed company. 254 Pa. at 146-50, 98 A. at 95658. Additionally, the Beltz court adopted the lower court's holding that "[a] corporation acts
by its directors and, practically for the purpose of binding it, they are the corporation." 254
Pa. at 153, 98 A. at 958. Therefore, if the promoters enter into a contract with an individual,
and those promoters continue to accept the benefits of the contract after becoming directors
of the newly formed corporation, then the corporationwill be liable to the one with whom
the promoters originally contracted. Additionally, the Beltz court held that:
The adoption of a contract may be inferred from acts done, although no resolution is
passed . . . . The company received the benefits and cannot be relieved of the burden. The principle upon which a corporation is held liable for the acts of its promoters is that it cannot receive benefits without assuming the burdens.
254 Pa. 145, 152, 98 A. 956, 958 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
54. 276 Pa. 492, 497, 120 A. 467, 468 (1923). The Bonner court reaffirmed the Girard
holding, although it distinguished Girard on its facts. Id. at 497, 120 A. at 468.
55. Id.
56. 455 Pa. 496, 317 A.2d 283 (1974).
57. The court relied on both Tift and Girard in reaching its decision, but distinguished Beltz on its facts. Id. at 500, 317 A.2d at 285.
58. See Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Christy, 79 Pa. 54, af'd sub nom. Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890). See also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Beltz v. Garrison, 254 Pa. 145, 98 A. 956 (1916) (per curiam).
60. See generally Beltz and Girard v. Case Bros. Cutlery Co., 225 Pa. 327, 74 A. 201
(1909). See also supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
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Implicit in the Third Circuit's determination that Mosaic had
ratified the contract in question was its tacit reliance upon the
above stated criteria. 1 Indeed, based upon the facts as delineated
in the opinion, this finding was both reasonable and well within
the confines of the current Pennsylvania law on ratification. As the
record established, two of the three promoters of Mosaic had
knowledge of the contract between Rees and Williams; two of these
promoters, Williams and Marshall, became officers and directors of
Mosaic; and Mosaic, subsequent to incorporation, continued to accept the benefits of the contract.6 2 In light of these circumstances,
the Third Circuit's conclusion was sound."
More importantly, however, the Rees court also determined that
the ratification "related back"64 to the time of the pre-incorporation activities."' In Pennsylvania, this doctrine permits a subse61. 742 F.2d at 767. Also implicit in the Third Circuit's holding was the concept of
"implied ratification". It has long been the law of Pennsylvania that ratification can be either express or implied. See Bell v. Scranton Trust Co., 282 Pa. 562, 569, 128 A. 494, 496
(1925).
62. 742 F.2d at 767. The court specifically found that "[i]n the case of Mosaic the
promoters who dealt with Rees and later ratified the contract were acting with authority; at
all relevant times each held positions of president or chief executive officer of the corporation." Id. at 769. See also supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
64. 742 F.2d at 769. The concept of relation back, a legal fiction, is in actuality, the
heart of ratification itself. In F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 195 (4th ed.
1952), Mechem states that every ratification relates back and is equivalent to prior authority. Id. In W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 39B (1964), the author notes:
The most characteristic feature of ratification is that described as "relation back" to
the time and place of the first transaction. This is merely a fictitious method of stating that the rights and liabilities are the same as if the purported principal became a
party at that time and place.
Id. Moreover, this concept runs counter to other areas of the law. For instance, under contract law, one cannot bind himself retroactively on a contract without receiving consideration therefore, and without communication to the other contracting party. See generally 1
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 67, 109 (1963).
Likewise, traditional tort law does not recognize a principal's liability for compensatory or
punitive damages after the completion of a tort when the tortfeasor was not the principal's
agent at the commission of the tort. Thus, while under vicarious liability a master will be
responsible for the torts of his servant due to his ability to select and control his servant, W.
PROSSER

& P. KEETON,

LAW OF TORTS

§ 69 (5th ed. 1984), such reasoning will not justify the

ratification of a tort because the master necessarily enters the scene after the tort has been
committed. See also SEAVEY § 32 A.
65. 742 F.2d at 769. The leading Pennsylvania decision on the "relation back" principle is Evans v. Ruth, 129 Pa. Super. 192, 195 A. 163 (1937). In Evans, the court stated that
"lilt
is a well recognized rule of law that, if A assumes to act for B ....and B subsequently
affirms A's act, it is a ratification which related back and supplies original authority for the
act." Id. at 195, 195 A. at 165. See also In re Eastern Supply Co., 267 F.2d 776, 778 (3d Cir.
1959) ("relation back" principle applies to bankruptcy proceeding).

Similarly, support for this proposition may be found in RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF AGENCY
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quently ratified pre-incorporation agreement to relate back in time
to when the contract was first entered into between the promoter
and third party.6 Moreover, by incorporating the concept of relation back into ratification, liability attaches in situations that
would otherwise leave a plaintiff without a remedy. By determining that the defendant's subsequent ratification related back to the
time of the original agreement between Rees and Williams, the
court was able to determine the more crucial issue of in personam
jurisdiction.
In questions involving jurisdiction, federal courts are required to
follow the law of the forum state in which they sit when determining whether a foreign corporation can be sued in that state. 7 One
commentator has pointed out that courts typically follow a "two
step" test when analyzing this issue. 8 The first part of the test
requires statutory authority before a non-resident can be subjected
§§ 82, 100A (1957). Section 82 states:
Ratification
Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind him but
which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all
persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him.
Id.
Section 100A states:
Relation Back in Time and Place
The liabilities of the parties to a ratified act or contract are determined in accordance
with the law governing the act or contract at the time and place it was done or made.
Whether the conduct of the purported principal is an aflirmance depends upon the
law at the time and place when and where the principal consents or acts.
Id.
66. With respect to post-incorporation ratification and relation back, Pennsylvania
varies from most other jurisdictions. Generally, the ratification of a pre-incorporation contract does not relate back in time to the original execution of the promoter/third party
contract. This is due to the simple fact that a corporation does not legally exist at the time
of contracting; hence, original authority for the acts of the promoter agent is lacking. Instead, it is deemed that new consideration was tendered at the time of ratification, with
"relation back" going only the date of incorporation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 84
comment d (1957) is particularly illustrative on this point: "The obligation of the corporation cannot have an effective date before the organization becomes a legal entity." Id.
Pennsylvania, however, deems a subsequently ratified pre-incorporation agreement as relating back to the time of the inception of the contract between the promoter and the third
party. See 8 A PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, CORPORATION § 18 (1971). See also McCloskey v. Charleroi Mountain Club, 390 Pa. 212, 134 A.2d 873 (1957); Central Trust Co. of
Pittsburgh v. Lappe, 216 Pa. 549, 65 A. 1111 (1907).
67. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). For an extended and highly detailed history
of in personam jurisdiction, see Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause, and
the In Personam Jurisdictionof State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla: a Review, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
68. Comment, Pennsylvania's New Long-Arm Statute: Extended Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations,79 DIcra L. REv. 51 (1974).
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to suit in a given state. The second part necessarily follows from
the first, i.e., if statutory authority exists, the court's exercise of in
personam jurisdiction must not offend the non-resident's due process rights. 9
The first half of this test is met in the instant case because
Pennsylvania, like all other states,7 0 provides statutory authority
for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident.
This authority is found in Pennsylvania's long-arm statute which
cloaks its courts with jurisdiction over non-residents "to the fullest
extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States
"71 Since this statute has been held to be
coterminous with
7
2
the scope of the due process clause, the inquiry thus properly
shifts to part two of the above test, namely, the73court's exercise of
in personam jurisdiction over the non-resident.
Due process requires that before a non-resident can be amenable
to suit in a state court, a basis for personal jurisdiction must first
exist.7 4 Without an appropriate jurisdictional basis, a non-resident
defendant would be subject to an unreasonable burden which does
not "comport with due process. ' 75 It is therefore necessary that the
non-resident have some "minimum contact" or other "reasonable"
relationship to the forum state before due process requirements
can be satisfied. 76 What constitutes an adequate basis for this relationship has been the center of much litigation and controversy
77
since the Supreme Court's historic decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.
69. Id. at 51-52.
70. The constitutionality of such statutes was initially upheld in Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The Illinois
statute allowed for jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible under the United States Constitution. The defendant Pennsylvania corporation manufactured a water heater. The heater
subsequently exploded, injuring the plaintiff in Illinois. The court concluded that "[a]s a
general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another
State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those
products." Id. at -, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
71. 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5322(b) (Purdon 1981), reproduced in full in note 22, supra.
72. See generally Koenig v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 284 Pa. Super. 558,
567, 426 A.2d 635, 639 (1980). See also supra note 23 and accompanying text, and U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. For an excellent and in-depth discussion and history of Pennsylvania's long-arm
statute, see Comment, Pennsylvania's New Long-Arm Statute: Extended Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations,79 DICK. L. REv. 51 (1974).
74. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
75. Id. at 317.
76. E.g., id. at 316; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980).
77. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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In Pennoyer, the state of Oregon, in an attempt to secure jurisdiction, attached certain property owned by the defendant. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court adopted a strict territorial
approach to jurisdiction. The Court concluded that in personam
jurisdiction in the forum state could not be obtained over a nonresident unless he were personally served with process within the
borders of the state, or unless he voluntarily appeared there to defend his suit.78 Thus, the court in the forum state was confined, in
a jurisdictional sense, to its territorial boundaries. With the onslaught of the industrial revolution and the growing number of
large corporations with operations spanning several states, however, this rule quickly fell into disfavor. 79 Criticism was based upon
the fact that a corporation could not have legal existence outside of
the state in which it was created.8 0 As a result, when many corporations began conducting business in foreign states, the Pennoyer
territorial concept gave them virtual immunity to suit outside of
their home state since there was no way to effectuate service of
process.8 1
In order to avoid the injustices which followed from this fundamental weakness of the territorial concept, the courts began to develop legal fictions.8 2 One such fiction was the "implied consent"
theory, which presupposed that a foreign corporation would only
transact business in those states in which it had registered one of
its agents with the state's officials.8 3 This facilitated service of pro78. Id. at 733.
79. The rationale behind Pennoyer has been the subject of extensive criticism, see,
e.g., Ross, The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction,17 MINN. L. REV. 146 (1933); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241 (1965); Von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
80. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839) (a corporation can have no
legal existence outside of the state boundaries in which it was created).
81. See Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963); McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
82. See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1066
(1969).
83. See e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882). In St. Clair,the defendant corporation had been incorporated under the laws of Illinois. The plaintiff, a Michigan resident,
brought suit in Michigan. Michigan law provided, inter alia, that jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation would attach if any officer or agent of the corporation were personally served in
Michigan. Id. at 351-53. In that portion of the opinion that affirmed the validity of the
Michigan statute, the Court, speaking through Justice Field, indicated that the "doctrine of
the exemption of a corporation from suit in a State other than that of its creation was the
cause of much inconvenience, and of manifest injustice." Id. at 355. Therefore, the Court
concluded that in order to conduct business in another state, a foreign corporation either
expressly or impliedly consents to the conditions imposed by the state:
If a State permits a foreign corporation to do business within her limits, and at the
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cess, and thus jurisdiction could be obtained over the foreign corporation if sued in that state.
The other legal fiction to emerge was the "presence" theory.
Under this approach, the corporation's amenability to suit was dependent upon its "presence" or the amount of business activity
conducted within the state."' If a certain threshold were met, the
company was subject to suit within that state's borders.8 5
These various theories ultimately presented difficult problems
for the courts. Among these difficulties was the determination of
whether under either theory, the corporation was doing business in
the state.8 As one judge stated, these did "no more than put the
question[s] to be answered.

'8 7

In 1945, however, the landmark de-

cision of InternationalShoe Company v. Washington88 laid these
legal fictions to rest.
same time provides that in suits against it for business there done, process shall be
served upon its agents, the provision is to be deemed a condition of the permission;
and corporations that subsequently do business in the State are to be deemed to
assent to such condition as fully as though they had specially authorized their agents
to receive service of the process.
Id. at 356. The court was quick to note, however, that such statutes must not encroach upon
the principles of "natural justice," and that notice must be reasonable; process may only be
served upon those "agents as may be properly deemed representatives of the foreign corpo-

ration." Id.
Likewise, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), although the defendant was an individual and not a corporation, the Court concluded that a non-resident motorist's use of the
highways of Massachusetts was, pursuant to a Massachusetts statute, "the equivalent of the

appointment of the registrar [of motor vehicles] as agent on whom process may be served."
Id. at 357.
84. See, e.g., Philadelphia and Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917),
wherein the Court concluded that the defendant's presence within the forum was insufficient to allow for jurisdiction. The Court stated that defendant's only presence within New
York was the sale of coupon tickets. Were the sale of these tickets a "doing of business"
then, the Court forewarned, "nearly every railroad company in the country would be 'doing
business' in every State." Id. at 268.
85. 243 U.S. at 265. As an example of this threshold, Justice Brandeis stated: "A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of
consent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to
warrant the inference that it is present there." Id.
86. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1066-67 (1969).
See also Comment, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REV.
909, 922 (1960). The authors of Developments note that much case law centered upon the
determination of whether a corporation was "doing business" in the forum. For instance, the
mere presence of an officer within the forum, as well as a subsidiary's presence, would not
allow for jurisdiction. The author also notes that the degree of solicitation necessary to constitute the carrying on of business was likewise a subject of much debate and dispute. Id. at
922.

87.
Hand).
88.

Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (Judge L.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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In InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court rejected the "implied
consent" and "presence" theories and established what is now the
modern doctrine of in personam jurisdiction.8 9 The Court, in relaxing the strict territorial principle of Pennoyer, concluded that
the foreign corporation's activities in the forum state (e.g., presence of salesmen, solicitation of goods, etc.), provided certain minimum contacts through which in personam jurisdiction would attach.9 0 In a much quoted passage, the Court stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."'"

In reaching this decision, the Court rejected a mechanical or
quantitative approach when determining what acts by a corporation would subject it to a court's jurisdiction.2 Instead, it furnished a flexible guide whereby each case could be decided upon
its unique facts. Thus, the courts began the evolutionary process of
expanding jurisdiction over individual and corporate non9 3
residents.
The next major decision by the Supreme Court on in personam
jurisdiction expanded InternationalShoe's "fair play" and "substantial justice" standard. In McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Company,94 the Court upheld jurisdiction over a non-resident
89. Id. at 316-19.
90. Id. at 320. The International Shoe Company was sued by the State of Washington
in order to enforce International Shoe's contribution to the State's unemployment compensation fund. The Court concluded that International Shoe's activities (presence of salesmen,
solicitation for orders, renting space for displaying goods, and the shipment of goods into
Washington) were regular and systematic and constituted a doing of business in the state.
Id. at 314. "It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the
state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of
fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there." Id. at 320.
91. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
92. 326 U.S. at 319. The Court stated: "It is evident that the criteria by which we
mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative." Id.
93. For an excellent discussion of this evolutionary process, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1067-69 (1969).
94. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In McGee, the plaintiff sued the defendant, a Texas corporation, in California. The defendant was sued via registered mail in Texas pursuant to a California statute which subjected foreign corporations to suit in California on insurance contracts, even though such corporations could not be served with process within California. Id.
at 221. The Court noted that the contract had been delivered in California, the premiums
had been mailed from California, and that the insured at the time of his death was a Cali-
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corporation whose only contact with the forum state was the issuance through the mails of a sole insurance contract to a resident of
the forum state.9 5 The McGee Court based its determination on
the premise that the contract had a "substantial connection" with
the state.96 The Court conceded that inconvenience to the non-resident company was probable, but not to a degree "which
' 97
amount[ed] to a denial of due process.
McGee represented the pinnacle of the Court's permissive jurisdiction, as well as a further departure from Pennoyer's strict territorial concept. The McGee Court implicitly incorporated a test of
"reasonableness" into the "substantial justice" and "fair play"
standards of InternationalShoe, and suggested that courts should
look to the interests of the plaintiff and the forum state when deciding the appropriateness of in personam jurisdiction over a non98
resident.
9 decided only one year after McGee, the
In Hanson v. Denckla,"
Court retreated from this liberal approach to jurisdiction and
somewhat revived the territorial principle of Pennoyer. In holding
that Florida could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee when it seemed certain that minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due process existed, the Court stated that the jurisdictional restrictions on state courts "are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."' 0 0
The court relied upon the quid pro quo that jurisdiction can only
be exercised over those non-resident defendants who "purposefully
[avail themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its
laws." 10
'
fornia resident. According to the Court, these contacts satisfied the requirements of International Shoe. Id. at 222-23. The Court also concluded that California, too, "ha[d] a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers
refuse to pay claims." Id. at 223.
95. Id. at 222-23.
96. Id. at 223.
97. Id. at 224.
98. Id. at 223-24. In stating that the interests of the plaintiff should be considered, the
Court specifically noted that the increasing nationalization of commerce had resulted in
many interstate transactions, and that "[a]t the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
State where he engages in economic activity." Id. at 223. See also Lilly, Jurisdiction Over
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 89-91 (1983).
99. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
100. Id. at 251.
101. Id. at 253.
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The cumulative effect of these decisions led one group of commentators to formulate a three-pronged test for determining when
in personam jurisdiction could be exercised over a non-resident
based only on a single act in the forum state, without violating that
non-resident's due process rights. 10 2 Approximately ten years later,
the Sixth Circuit, in Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries
Inc.,1 03 adopted this standard with slight modifications.10° The
Southern Machine court concluded that in personam jurisdiction
would attach where the defendant purposefully availed himself of
the privilege of acting within the forum; the cause of action arose
from those activities; and, those acts have created a meaningful
connection with the state.1 0 5 Since then, a majority of courts across
the country have followed Southern Machine's lead, and have
adopted some variation of the three-pronged test.1 0 6
As previously discussed, 10 7 Judge Adams, writing for the Rees
court, relied on Procter & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber
Co., 108 in applying this same test. As Judge Adams noted, the first
102. Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based On A Single Act: A
New Sole For InternationalShoe, 47 GEo. L.J. 342 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Georgetown
Note). As the authors discuss, the three prongs are:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction
within the forum. It is not necessary that defendant's agent be physically within the
forum, for this act or transaction may be by mail only. A single event will suffice if its
effects within the state are substantial enough to qualify under Rule Three.
(2) The cause of action must be one which arises out of, or results from, the activities
of the defendant within the forum. It is conceivable that the actual cause of action
might come to fruition in another state, but because of the activities of defendant in
the forum state there would still be a "substantial minimum contact."
(3) Having established by Rules One and Two a minimum contact between defendant
and the state, the assumption of jurisdiction based upon such contact must be consonant with the due process tenets of "fair play" and "substantial justice." If this test is
fulfilled, there exists a "substantial minimum contact" between the forum and the
defendant. The reasonableness of subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction under this
rule is frequently tested by standards analogous to those of forum non conveniens.
Id. at 351-52 (footnotes omitted). This test presupposes that statutory authority exists for
the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the non-resident's single act. Id. See also discussion
in notes 70-72 and accompanying text, relating to the necessity of statutory authority.
103. 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
104. Id. at 381. The modifications to the original three-pronged test are in wording
only, and the overall flavor of the court's test is the same as the proposed test in the Georgetown Note. See supra note 102.
105. 401 F.2d at 381.
106. For an exhaustive sampling of those courts adopting the three-pronged test, see
Comment, Pennsylvania's New Long-Arm Statute: Extended Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations, 79 DICK. L. REV. 51, 77 n.136 (1974); and Kingsley & Keith (Can.) Ltd. v.
Mercer Int'l., 500 Pa. 371, 378 n.6, 456 A.2d 1333, 1337 n.6 (1983).
107. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
108. 228 Pa. Super. 12, 19, 323 A.2d 11, 15 (1974). The court in Procteradopted the
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prong of the Procter test is that "the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 10 9
This prong is taken from the combined holdings of Hanson" ° and
McGee."' The amount of activity by the non-resident is, however,
relatively unimportant under the application of this prong, and is
considered sufficient by this standard when a single direct action
has taken place within the forum state." 2
For example, in McGee, the Supreme Court found a basis for
jurisdiction when the only contact with the forum consisted of a
sole insurance contract and premium payments thereon." 3 Thus,
when the Third Circuit in the instant case held that the pre-incorporation agreement between Rees and Marshall satisfied this first
requirement, it was well within the confines of the rule. In Rees,
not only was there a contract entered into in Pennsylvania, but
office space was shared with two of the three promoters of Mosaic
in Pennsylvania, and payments were made to Rees in Pennsylvania
by Mosaic from New Hampshire. This fact situation is clearly
analogous to that in McGee." 4 Additionally, there was a conclusive
indication that Mosaic had "purposefully availed" itself of the
privilege of acting within Pennsylvania because the contract was to
be substantially performed there. Moreover, based upon the Hanson rationale, Mosaic could have expected to be haled into a Pennsylvania court. Therefore, the Third Circuit reached the correct result by holding that the first prong of the Procter test was met.",
The second prong of the Procter test, that "the cause of action
must arise directly from the defendant's activities within the forum state,""' also has its foundations in Hanson."" Derived from
a reasonableness standard, which requires that a non-resident's
Southern Machine text in its entirety, without a change in language. Id.
109. Id. at 19, 323 A.2d at 15.
110. 357 U.S. at 253.
111. 355 U.S. at 222-23.
112. See Georgetown Note, supra note 102, at 353.
113. 355 U.S. at 222.
114. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
115. This conclusion rests on the reasoning that Mosaic's pre-incorporation activities
could be figured into the jurisdictional equation. 742 F.2d at 768-69. Without the benefit of
these pre-incorporation activities, due process would not have been served if the court had
found a basis for jurisdiction. See Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735
F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1984) (defendants held to have had insufficient contacts with the forum
under Procter test).
116. 228 Pa. Super. at 19, 323 A.2d at 15.
117. 357 U.S. at 251-52.
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acts within the forum must be directly related to the cause of action,118 this aspect of Procter is significant because without a direct
relationship between the non-resident's activities and the forum,
the non-resident's connection to the forum state, and thus the
cause of action, could not be established. Therefore, any tangential
or unrelated acts by the defendant would be deemed
insignificant. 1 9
The application of this second prong to the facts in the principal
case is relatively straightforward. In Rees, it was undisputed that
the contract, Mosaic's act within the forum state, was directly related to the cause of action. 1 0 Indeed, the contract dispute gave
rise to the cause of action. Because this prong was meant to apply
to this precise factual setting, the court reached the only result
1 21
possible under the mandates of the test.
The third element of the test, stemming from Hanson 2 ' and InternationalShoe,' 2 ' and deemed "most important" by the Procter
court, provides that "the acts of the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it reasonable."' 24 Implicit in the analysis of
whether this prong has been met is the concept of "fairness." In
order to determine whether there has been a substantial connection with the forum state, all of the dispositive factors which come
into play must be weighed with regard to "traditional notions of
fair play."'1 2 5 These factors involve the inconvenience to the nonresident corporation in defending its suit in a distant forum; 2 ' the
benefits derived by the non-resident corporation from conducting
its business within the forum; 27 and, the factors previously discussed in the first two prongs of the Procter test. Although the
Rees court's analysis of these factors was limited, its reasoning that
the concept of "fairness" implicit in the third prong of the test
centered on the forum state's interest in resolving a suit brought
118. 228 Pa. Super. at 19, 323 A.2d at 15. See also Georgetown Note, supra note 102,
at 353-54.
119. 228 Pa. Super. at 19-20, 323 A.2d at 15-16.
120. 742 F.2d at 766-67.
121. See also Georgetown Note, supra note 102, at 355-59.
122. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See supra note 99 and accompanying
text.
123. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
124. 326 U.S. at 316.
125. Id. at 317.
126. Id. at 319.
127. Procter, 228 Pa. Super. at 20, 323 A.2d at 16.
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by one of its citizens 128 nevertheless comported with the goals that
a weighing of the above factors seeks to accomplish. Therefore,
when the Third Circuit held that jurisdiction over Mosaic was fair
in light of legitimate state interests, 129 the court stayed well within
the confines of Procterand properly applied the third prong of the
test.
Given the requirements of Procter, the Third Circuit's conclusion that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over Mosaic was
a sound result. If there is to be any criticism on this aspect of the
court's decision, it is that Judge Adams laid little groundwork for
his final holding. Once he initially found a basis upon which to find
jurisdiction, i.e., Mosaic's ratification of the contract, little discussion was spent in applying the three-pronged Procter test. Of
course, the court's brief treatment of the case could also be considered a strength. Allowing that questions concerning in personam
jurisdiction are frequently encountered, and that much has been
written on the subject, the Third Circuit could properly have concluded that little was needed to be said. The Rees decision, therefore, represents a logical step forward in the evolutionary process
of the law of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. In a
logical and well-reasoned opinion, the Third Circuit was able to
bridge the gap between post-incorporation ratification of pre-incorporation acts and in personam jurisdiction, to reach a result which
is timely in today's highly technical, multinational corporate world.
Notwithstanding Judge Adam's terse style, the end result in Rees,
a case of first impression, will have strong precedential value for
the future decisions which will undoubtedly follow from the court's
holding. Indeed, the Rees decision will go far in ensuring that businessmen can deal with out-of-state promoters and corporations
and be treated justly for their efforts.
Edward G. Rice

128. Rees, 742 F.2d at 769. According to the court, Pennsylvania's legitimate interest
was to ensure that contracts made and to be performed in Pennsylvania were not breached,
and that its citizens had a forum when a breach thereof occurred. Id.
129. Id.

